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Executive Summary  
 
The Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System (“MJDS”) offers significant savings to 
Canadian issuers that use it (“Canadian MJDS Issuers”).  Our cost benefit analysis 
reveals that the Net Present Value of aggregate cost savings to Canadian MJDS Issuers 
from (a) using Forms F-9 and F-10 for U.S. public offerings; (b) using MJDS forms for 
meeting U.S. continuous disclosure obligations; and (c) minimizing lost “windows of 
opportunities”, ranges from US$1.6 billion to US$3 billion over a ten year period, 
assuming a discount rate of 7%. 
 
We find that the main savings of MJDS remain intact despite the fact that Canadian 
MJDS Issuers are being required to comply with the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (“SOX”).   
 
The OSC’s Initiatives1 will not impose additional costs on reporting issuers in Ontario 
that are using MJDS and complying with SOX requirements to the extent that the OSC’s 
Initiatives conform to those SOX requirements.  
 
The Net Present Value of the external professional fees paid by Canadian issuers with 
securities listed in the U.S. to comply with SOX requirements is estimated at U.S.$683 
million over a ten-year period, using a discount rate of seven percent. If Canadian issuers 
listed in the U.S. were exempted from compliance with SOX requirements by the SEC 
and could instead comply with comparable Canadian requirements that conform to SOX 
requirements, this amount would drop to approximately U.S.$410 million, resulting in 
savings of approximately U.S.$273 million. 
                                                 
1 The OSC Initiatives refer to the new rules that are expected to be released by the OSC in respect of (i) 
CEO/CFO certifications of internal controls and procedures; (ii) CEO/CFO certification of financial 
statements; and (iii) the composition, functioning and responsibilities of audit committees, as described in 
more detail in Part 5 of this report.    
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 1.  Introduction  
 
We are pleased to submit this report entitled, “A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Multi-
Jurisdictional Disclosure System” to the Ontario Securities Commission (“OSC”).    
 
SOX and the OSC’s Initiatives raise important issues about the net benefit of MJDS 
going forward. In Part 2 of this report, we analyze the costs and benefits of MJDS.  In 
Part 3, we assess the impact of SOX requirements on Canadian Eligible MJDS Issuers 
and the implications on cost savings from MJDS. In Part 4, we analyze the impact of 
OSC’s Initiatives on Canadian MJDS Issuers, under the assumption that such initiatives 
maintain conformity to SOX. We also assess the impact of the OSC’s Initiatives not 
conforming to SOX.   
 
During the course of our analysis, we conducted numerous interviews with relevant 
stakeholders: (a) three Canadian MJDS Issuers; (b) senior securities lawyers at five 
Canadian law firms and six U.S. law firms that represent Canadian MJDS Issuers; (c) 
senior partners at an international accounting firm; and (d) one investment bank.  We also 
met with senior staff at the OSC and at the Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”).  
Confidential information that was provided to us by the stakeholders was used to develop 
the simple cost-benefit analysis that is presented in this report. 
 
 
2. Principles of Securities Regulation 
  
The purpose of securities law is to maintain investor confidence in the marketplace and to 
enhance the efficiency of capital markets.2 Given the increasingly global nature of capital 
markets, securities laws should be designed so as to retain and attract capital to Ontario.3  
  
                                                 
2 The Securities Act (Ontario) R.S.O. 1990, CHAPTER S.5, s 1.1 states the purposes of the act are: “(a) to 
provide protection to investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices; and (b) to foster fair and 
efficient capital markets and confidence in capital markets.”  
 
3 The Five Year Review Committee Draft Report – Reviewing the Securities Act (Ontario) recommended 
that section 2.1 of the Securities Act (Ontario) be amended to direct the OSC to have regard to, inter alia, 
the principal that “capital markets are international in character and it is desirable to maintain the 
competitive position of Ontario's capital markets” in pursuing the objectives of the Securities Act (Ontario). 
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3.  Cost Benefit Analysis of MJDS  
 
(a) Introduction 
 
The MJDS was adopted in 1991 by the Canadian Securities Administrators ("CSA") and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States ("SEC") to reduce 
duplicative regulation and facilitate cross-border securities offerings by certain eligible 
Canadian reporting issuers in U.S. capital markets and certain eligible U.S. reporting 
issuers in Canadian capital markets.4 The MJDS is a system of mutual recognition that 
allows Canadian and U.S. issuers to carry on inter-jurisdictional securities activity with 
greater efficiency and reduced transactions costs.   
 
The MJDS operates on the basis that the underlying principles and policies and the 
overall practices and substantive standards of securities regulation in Canada and the U.S. 
are substantially similar.  
 
Under MJDS, eligible Canadian issuers can offer securities to the public in the U.S. using 
a prospectus prepared in accordance with Canadian standards. The document is filed with 
and reviewed by the applicable Canadian securities regulator(s). It is also filed with the 
SEC. A Canadian issuer is eligible to use MJDS Form F-9 to make a public offering in 
the U.S. of investment grade debt and preferred stock if it has a twelve-month reporting 
history in Canada; if the securities are convertible after one year, the issuer must also 
have a public float of U.S.$75 million.    A Canadian issuer is eligible to use MJDS Form 
F-10 to make public offerings of any security in the U.S. if it has a market capitalization 
of U.S.$75 million and a twelve-month reporting history in Canada.  
 
Under MJDS, eligible Canadian issuers can fulfill their continuous disclosure 
requirements under the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by filing their Canadian 
continuous disclosure documents with the SEC.  Canadian MJDS Issuers may file their 
Canadian Annual Information Form (“AIF”), Management Discussion and Analysis 
(“MD&A”) and Canadian GAAP financial statements (reconciled to U.S. GAAP) on 
Form 40-F.  The SEC does not generally review Form 40-F.  Canadian issuers that are 
ineligible to use MJDS are required to file continuous disclosure documents as foreign 
private issuers using Form 20-F or as U.S. domestic issuers using Form 10-K, both of 
which are reviewable by the SEC.     
 
                                                 
4 See National Policy No. 45 “Multijurisdictional Disclosure System” (1991) 14 O.S.C.B. 2867, National 
Instrument 71-101, Companion Policy 71-101CP, Rule 71-801, and Form 71-101F1.  See also 
Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration and Reporting System for 
Canadian Issuers, Release No. 33-6902, 56 Fed. Reg. 30036, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) paragraph 84, 812, at 81,860 (July 1, 1991); See also Release No. 33-6879 and Release No. 33-
7025. 
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As a result of MJDS, the substantive disclosure required for both public offerings and 
continuous disclosure by Canadian MJDS Issuers (other than the requirement to provide a 
reconciliation describing material differences between Canadian GAAP and U.S. GAAP 
financial statements) are determined by Canadian laws and regulations rather than SEC 
rules.    
 
Eligible Canadian issuers can also use MJDS for rights offerings (Form F-7) and 
exchange offerings (Form F-8). Due to the greater frequency with which Form F-9 and 
Form F-10 are used by Canadian issuers, the analysis in this report focuses on these 
forms and does not analyze the cost savings associated with Form F-7 and Form F-8. In 
this regard, the conclusions we reach with respect to MJDS savings are limited to those 
realized from the use of Form F-9 and Form F-10.  
 
(b) Use of MJDS By Canadian Issuers 
 
This section of the report identifies the main uses and savings of MJDS by the Canadian 
MJDS Issuers that use Forms F-9 and F-10. 
 
(i) Public Offerings 
 
From 1991 to 2002, Canadian MJDS Issuers used Form F-9 for 105 public offerings and 
Form F-10 for 224 public offerings.5   
 
MJDS provides significant benefits to eligible Canadian issuers conducting public 
offerings in the U.S.  There was unanimous agreement amongst all stakeholders we 
interviewed that a Canadian issuer ought to use MJDS for a public offering if it is eligible 
to do so.  
 
Canadian issuers that are not eligible to use Form F-9 or Form F-10 for public offerings 
because they do not meet the relevant thresholds of market capitalization and/or reporting 
history must comply with the requirements applicable to foreign private issuers or U.S. 
domestic issuers. 
 
The benefits of MJDS use by Canadian MJDS Issuers are set out below.  
 
              - Canadian Regulatory Requirements May Allow for Incorporation by Reference  
 
A Canadian MJDS Eligible Issuer can use a short form prospectus under the Prompt 
Offering Qualification System (the “POP System”) to complete a public offering of 
securities in the U.S.  A short form prospectus allows many items to be incorporated by 
reference which can result in significant cost savings. However, in MJDS transactions the 
disclosure in a Canadian short form prospectus is often substantially enhanced so that the 
offering document that is prepared, contains disclosure that is similar to that prepared for 
                                                 
5 Data obtained from Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison’s annual MJDS update (current to 
December 31, 2002) available at http://www.paulweiss.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/MJDS%20Tables.pdf  (last 
viewed May 17, 2003). 
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U.S. domestic issuers. This is done to address potential liability issues and marketing 
opportunities in the U.S. The resulting document is known as a “short-form/long-form,” 
implying short-form for Canadian regulatory purposes, but long-form for U.S. marketing 
and liability purposes. As a result, the disclosure-related savings that MJDS offers in the 
context of a U.S. public offering is in many cases not substantial.6 
 
- Absence of SEC Review 
 
The primary aspect of MJDS savings at the offering stage is the absence of SEC review. 
In Ontario, a short form issuer can often receive initial comments from a Canadian 
regulator within three to five days and in many cases obtain a final receipt in less than 
two weeks.  In comparison, the SEC takes 30 days for initial comments and five days for 
subsequent comments. It is important to note that the SEC does not review all registration 
statements. The SEC may decide that certain issuers warrant “no review” or only a 
“limited review” of certain aspects of their offering documents. However, lawyers we 
interviewed consistently indicated that a full review by the SEC could take a total of six 
to twelve weeks to obtain final clearance.  As a result, the SEC review process can be 
significantly longer than a corresponding MJDS review process conducted by Canadian 
securities regulators.  
 
The benefits of being reviewed by the Canadian regulator(s) rather than the SEC under 
MJDS can be broken down into two components, each of which is discussed below.    
 
 (1) Windows of Opportunity 
 
The first benefit of being reviewed by Canadian regulator(s) rather than the SEC under 
MJDS relates to the shorter time frame and certainty with which a public offering can be 
made.  The potentially longer SEC review increases the risk that a change in market 
conditions may prevent the issuer from taking advantage of the “window of opportunity” 
to raise capital on favourable terms.  The shorter review time achieved by Canadian 
regulators allows an issuer to better estimate its cost of capital and exposes it to a lower 
risk of negative changes in issuer specific conditions or general market, economic or 
political conditions.    
 
For example, if interest rates rise during the period of SEC review, an issuer planning to 
do a debt offering may find itself faced with a higher cost of capital which may require it 
to borrow less capital than initially planned or borrow capital at a higher net cost. 
Alternatively, if an issuer’s share price falls or the market declines dramatically during 
the period of SEC review, an issuer planning on doing an equity offering may need to 
issue more shares to raise the same amount of capital, resulting in greater dilution of 
existing shares.  
                                                 
6 Note that some lawyers we interviewed indicated that even for a Canadian newly MJDS Eligible Issuer, 
the short-form/long-form MJDS prospectus was significantly shorter than a U.S. domestic issuer’s long-
form offering document.  To the extent that the short-form long-form MJDS prospectus may be 
significantly shorter in some instances, the analysis in this report understates the savings associated with 
MJDS.  
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(2) Savings in Professional Fees 
 
Being reviewed by Canadian regulator(s) rather than the SEC under MJDS can also result 
in significant cost savings in respect of professional fees.  
 
  - Legal Fees  
  
Canadian issuers that wish to access public capital markets in the U.S. must retain both 
Canadian and U.S. legal counsel. When a Canadian issuer utilizes MJDS to conduct a 
U.S. public offering, Canadian legal counsel often prepares the prospectus according to 
Canadian regulatory requirements. If the issuer is advised to do so by its underwriter for 
U.S. marketing purposes, U.S. legal counsel adds to the disclosure to make it “look like” 
a U.S. offering document.   
 
When a Canadian issuer conducts a U.S. public offering as a foreign private issuer or as a 
U.S. domestic issuer, U.S. legal counsel takes primary responsibility for drafting the U.S. 
offering document; Canadian legal counsel, often times, plays a secondary role.  
 
For the purpose of analyzing the costs and benefits of MJDS in this study, we have 
assumed that the costs of Canadian legal counsel fees are constant whether or not a 
Canadian issuer uses MJDS and therefore are netted out in a cost benefit analysis.7 As a 
result, our analysis below focuses on savings to Canadian issuers of U.S. legal counsel 
fees from using MJDS. 
 
 Legal fees differ by issuer type, and in conducting our analysis, we devised three broad 
scenarios:8 (a) a U.S. equity initial public offering (“IPO”) by a Canadian issuer that is 
not MJDS eligible; (b) a U.S. equity IPO by a Canadian issuer that just meets MJDS 
requirements for filing on Form F-10; and (c) a U.S. public equity offering on Form F-10 
by a seasoned Canadian MJDS Eligible Issuer with a reporting history of at least 10 
years.  We asked U.S. lawyers what their average expected fees would be for each class 
of issuer.  Our results are summarized in Table 1 below.  
                                                 
7 Most Canadian lawyers that we interviewed indicated that Canadian legal counsel fees might sometimes 
be higher when a Canadian issuer does not use MJDS to make a public offering in the U.S.  We were 
advised that Canadian legal counsel fees might increase because the process of SEC review often takes 
longer than a comparable Canadian regulatory review and because Canadian legal counsel is still involved 
in reviewing the documents and providing opinions.   If this is true, then MJDS cost savings in this analysis 
are understated.  
8 Lawyers we interviewed indicated that U.S. legal counsel fees for Form F-9 offerings are often the same 
or greater than those for Form F-10 offerings. As a result, the analysis in this report uses U.S. legal counsel 
fees for Form F-10 filings as the basis for calculating the aggregate cost savings associated with use of both 
Form F-9 and Form F-10.   
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Table 1 
U.S. Counsel Legal Fees 
  
(a) U.S. Equity IPO by a 
Canadian Issuer that is not 
MJDS Eligible  
(b) U.S. Equity IPO by a 
Canadian newly-MJDS 
Eligible Issuer (Form F-10)  
(c) U.S. Public Equity 
Offering by a Seasoned 
Canadian MJDS Eligible 
Issuer (Form F-10) 
 
U.S.$300,000-U.S.$500,000 
 
U.S.$200,000-U.S.$350,000 
 
 
U.S.$100,000-U.S.$250,000 
 
 
A key reason why a Canadian issuer that is not MJDS eligible would on average incur 
higher U.S. legal counsel fees than a Canadian MJDS Eligible Issuer is because of the 
benefits associated with the absence of SEC review.  The difference represents U.S. legal 
counsel fees that would otherwise be incurred in addressing the SEC’s comments in the 
absence of MJDS.  
 
A comparison of a Canadian issuer’s U.S. counsel legal fees under the first and second 
scenarios above reveals some information on the savings in U.S. legal counsel fees from 
not having an SEC review.  This is because the issuer’s characteristics are relatively 
similar under both these scenarios, making it unnecessary to control for them. As Table 1 
reveals, our research suggests a range of U.S.$300,000 to U.S.$500,000 for the first 
scenario and a range of U.S.$200,000 to U.S.$350,000 for the second scenario.  These 
figures suggest that in the absence of MJDS, when a Canadian issuer would be subject to 
full review by the SEC, such issuer’s U.S. legal counsel’s fees would be approximately 
150% more than under the MJDS.    
 
In order to test the accuracy of this result, we used another method to quantify savings in 
U.S. legal counsel fees.  Since the SEC generally takes thirty days to provide initial 
comments on an issuer’s offering document, there ought to be only minimal legal fees 
incurred during that thirty day time period. Deducting this time from the six to twelve 
week range that is needed on average to complete SEC review leaves us with 
approximately two to eight weeks during which U.S. legal counsel is addressing 
comments as compared to the three days to two weeks that Canadian regulators would 
take under MJDS.  Post receipt of initial comments from the SEC, the regulatory 
approval process is still four times longer in the absence of MJDS.  
 
A reasonable assumption would be that U.S. legal counsel would work as intensively on a 
per day basis during the two to eight week period as it would during the shorter MJDS 
time period of three days to two weeks. However, we adopt a more conservative 
approach of assuming that SEC review results in an eighty percent per day workload 
relative to a similar process under MJDS. This implies that SEC review results in 
Canadian issuers incurring roughly three times more in U.S. legal counsel fees as 
 9
compared to MJDS (4 times longer process after initial comments are received by the 
regulators x 80%).  
  
As a result, we conclude that, on average, a Canadian issuer’s U.S. legal counsel fees 
would be one and a half to three times higher if MJDS did not exist or were eliminated.  
 
    - Accounting Fees 
 
We have found that MJDS savings in respect of accounting and auditing fees are not 
substantial.  Canadian MJDS Issuers using MJDS Forms F-9 and F-10 do not need to 
prepare U.S. GAAP financial statements when doing public offerings in the U.S.  They 
can use their Canadian GAAP financial statements but must prepare a reconciliation with 
U.S. GAAP.  Since this benefit is also available to Canadian issuers that are foreign 
private issuers, it was not taken into account in our cost benefit analysis. We were 
advised that the cost of auditing financial statements (which includes an audit of the U.S. 
GAAP reconciliation statement) could be significant.  However, this cost also does not 
factor into our cost benefit analysis because it is a cost incurred by Canadian issuers 
using MJDS as well as Canadian issuers that are foreign private issuers.  
 
It is important to highlight however that Canadian MJDS Issuers that issue non-
convertible preferred stock or investment grade debt on Form F-9 are relieved of the 
requirement to prepare an audited U.S. GAAP reconciliation. To the extent that this 
benefit has not been quantified, MJDS savings have been understated in this analysis.  
 
There are at least three accounting differences for a Canadian MJDS Eligible Issuer as 
compared to a Canadian foreign private issuer that may result in MJDS savings.  First, 
foreign private issuers must report one additional year of Income Statement and 
Statement of Cash Flow numbers as compared to Canadian MJDS Issuers. However, the 
cost of this additional reporting is negligible.  
 
Second, MJDS allows a Canadian MJDS Eligible Issuer’s Canadian GAAP financial 
statements (including the reconciliation to U.S. GAAP) to be audited in accordance with 
Canadian GAAS whereas a foreign private issuer must use U.S. GAAS.  U.S. GAAS has 
different standards than Canadian GAAS. For example, U.S. GAAS requires an 
engagement letter and a representation letter signed by management while Canadian 
GAAS does not impose such requirements. Another example is that U.S. and Canadian 
G.A.A.S. have different standards for fraud.   We understand from our interviews that 
many of the large accounting firms appear to use the U.S. GAAS standards as best 
practices with which they voluntarily comply.  As a result of different standards imposed 
by U.S. GAAS, there is an incremental cost associated in moving from a Canadian 
GAAS audit under MJDS to a U.S. GAAS audit as a foreign private issuer. 
 
A final savings for a Canadian issuer conducting a public offering using the MJDS in 
contrast to a Canadian issuer conducting an offering as a foreign private issuer is that the 
financial statements for the former are not generally reviewed by the SEC whereas they 
are generally reviewable for foreign private issuers. 
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    - Printer Fees 
 
The savings in printer fees under MJDS are not significant. As discussed above, a 
Canadian MJDS Eligible Issuer is entitled to use a Canadian short form prospectus that 
can be very short because it incorporates many items by reference. However, a Canadian 
MJDS Eligible Issuer often adds disclosure to its prospectus resulting in a document that 
is very similar to a U.S. style long-form offering document, as would be the case in the 
absence of MJDS.  Hence, the savings in printer fees savings are not significant.  
 
    - Underwriting Fees 
 
Because investment dealers’ fees are based on a percentage of the size of an issuer’s 
offering (as opposed to legal and accounting fees that are generally based on hourly 
rates), there are no significant savings in terms of dealer fees associated with using 
MJDS.  
 
     - Regulator Fees 
 
We ignore differences in fees charged by regulators in our cost benefit analysis. Because 
the SEC charges Canadian MJDS Issuers the same fees for filing Canadian disclosure 
documents under MJDS as it would a Canadian issuer filing as a foreign private issuer or 
U.S. domestic issuer, Canadian MJDS Issuers receive no cost savings in this regard. In 
effect, SEC fees are charged for filing documents, not for reviewing them. Since the OSC 
has recently moved to a fee structure that is based more on yearly maintenance as 
opposed to per-transaction, the analysis does not take into account differences in OSC 
fees.    
 
(ii) Continuous Disclosure  
 
MJDS is also used by Canadian MJDS Issuers to satisfy their U.S. continuous disclosure 
obligations. As at December 31, 2002, there were a total of 202 Canadian issuers listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ or the American Stock Exchange (see 
Table 2). Of Canadian issuers that filed annual disclosure documents in 2002, 45% used 
the MJDS Form 40-F, 33% filed Form 20-Fs as foreign private issuers and 22% filed 
Form 10-Ks as domestic issuers.9  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
ANNUAL DISCLOSURE FILINGS  
                                                 
9 Data for Table 2 was compiled from Paul, Weiss Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison’s annual MJDS update 
(current to December 31 2002) available at  http://www.paulweiss.com/db30/cgi-
bin/pubs/MJDS%20Tables.pdf  (last viewed May 17, 2003). 
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BY CANADIAN ISSUERS10 
As at December 31, 2002 
 
Stock Exchange Total 
Number of 
Canadian 
Issuers 
MJDS Issuer 
Form 40-F 
Foreign Private 
Issuer  
Form 20-F 
U.S. Domestic 
Issuer  
Form 10-K  
New York Stock 
Exchange 
82 55 9 12 
NASDAQ 88 27 37 23 
American Stock 
Exchange 
32 5 17 8 
Total 202 87 63 43 
 
 
Both legal rules and market pressures influence the method by which Canadian issuers 
meet their U.S. continuous disclosure obligations.  Certain Canadian issuers that filed as 
foreign private issuers using Form 20-F may not have met the eligibility criteria for 
MJDS so as to use MJDS Form 40-F. Other Canadian issuers did not meet the definition 
of foreign private issuer and thus had to meet their continuous disclosure obligations 
using U.S. domestic issuer Form 10-K.  
 
Interviews with stakeholders indicate that despite being eligible to use MJDS Form 40-F, 
many eligible Canadian MJDS Issuers “voluntarily file” foreign private issuer Form 20-F 
or U.S. domestic issuer Form 10-K.  This is often because they want to provide 
information that is comparable to U.S. domestic issuers, and “look like” U.S. domestic 
issuers.  Since competitors may be based in the U.S. and file as U.S. domestic issuers, 
they want to make it as easy as possible for U.S. research analysts to follow their stock.  
On the other hand, we were also told that many eligible Canadian MJDS Issuers that 
consider themselves “North American” or “World Class” issuers have a clear preference 
to use the MJDS Form 40-F expressly because it is not generally reviewed by the SEC.  
 
The savings in U.S. counsel legal fees associated with using MJDS forms for annual  
disclosure as opposed to foreign private issuer forms or domestic issuer forms are not 
substantial. Interviews with U.S. lawyers indicate that U.S. counsel legal fees for filing 
MJDS Form 40-F are in the range of U.S.$1,000 to U.S.$10,000, as compared to 
U.S.$7500 to U.S.$12,000 for filing a Form 20-F as a foreign private issuer or Form 10-K 
as a U.S. domestic issuer.   
 
The savings in accounting fees that were discussed earlier with respect to offerings are 
also relevant in the context of continuous disclosure obligations. The most important 
difference between filing an MJDS Form 40-F as opposed to a foreign private issuer 
Form 20-F or U.S. domestic issuer Form 10-K is that the first form is not generally 
reviewable by the SEC while the latter two forms are. 
                                                 
10 The sum of columns 3, 4 and 5 do not equal column 2 because some Canadian issuers do not appear to 
have filed in 2002. Id. 
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(c) Expanded Cost Benefit Analysis 
 
The above discussion lays the foundation for the cost benefit analysis of MJDS. The cost 
benefit analysis proceeds from fundamental and widely accepted principles of public 
economics analysis.  
 
In calculating costs and benefits of MJDS, the party that our analysis focuses on is 
Canadian issuers that use (a) MJDS Form F-9 for U.S. public offerings of preferred stock 
and investment grade debt; and (b) MJDS Form F-10 for other U.S. public securities 
offerings. 
   
Canadian issuers receive the same benefits from raising capital in U.S. public markets 
whether or not they employ MJDS. The relevant savings for Canadian issuers from 
MJDS stem from cost differences. Or 
 
 
Benefits = CostsNONMJDS – CostsMJDS   • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
 
Where CostsNONMJDS = Total Costs of Issuers in a Non-MJDS Scenario 
 
CostsMJDS = Total Costs of Issuers in a MJDS Scenario 
 
 
We know that: 
 
CostsNONMJDS = Legal Costs NONMJDS + Accounting Costs NONMJDS +   
 
Underwriter FeesNONMJDS + Printing Costs NONMJDS 
 
 
Similarly:  
 
CostsMJDS = Legal Costs MJDS + Accounting Costs MJDS +  Underwriter Fees MJDS  
 
+ Printing Costs MJDS 
 
 
As elaborated above, there is little difference in accounting costs, underwriter fees, and 
printing costs between MJDS and non-MJDS scenarios. Instead significant cost 
differences arise from the variation in U.S. legal counsel fees from both the review and 
disclosure processes. Or using the above notation: 
 
 
Benefits = CostsNONMJDS – CostsMJDS  =  Legal CostsNONMJDS –  Legal CostsMJDS   
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Cost Savings from U.S. Legal Counsel Fees associated with MJDS Forms F-9 and F-10 
 
We calculate costs savings separately for (a) a newly eligible Canadian MJDS Issuer and 
a (b) seasoned Canadian MJDS Issuer. Within this classification, cost savings with 
respect to not having an SEC review are estimated by taking the difference between the 
upper and lower bounds of the issuer’s U.S. counsel’s legal fees charged under MJDS 
detailed above, and the upper and lower bounds generated by our assumption that legal 
fees under a non-MJDS scenario should be between one and a half to three times higher.  
 
For example, for a type (a) issuer, U.S. legal counsel’s fees have been estimated to be 
between U.S.$200,000 to U.S.$350,000 under MJDS. If we assume that fees are one and 
a half times higher in a non-MJDS scenario, then a Canadian issuer’s U.S. legal counsel 
fees should be between U.S.$300,000 to U.S.$525,000. Cost savings under MJDS then 
range between U.S.$100,000 (U.S.$300,000-U.S.$200,000) to U.S.$175,000 
(U.S.$525,000–U.S.$350,000).  
 
Using similar methodology, we obtain a cost savings of U.S.$400,000 (U.S.$600,000-
U.S.$200,000) to U.S.$700,000 (U.S.$1,050,000–U.S.$350,000) for a type (a) issuer 
assuming a three times cost difference. Hence, cost savings for type (a) issuers under 
MJDS range from U.S.$100,000 to U.S.$700,000, assuming that legal fees under a non-
MJDS scenario should be between one and a half to three times higher. 
 
For a type (b) issuer, the issuer’s U.S. legal counsel fees have been estimated to be 
between U.S.$100,000 to U.S.$250,000 using MJDS. If fees are one and a half times 
higher in a non-MJDS scenario, then fees should be U.S.$150,000 to U.S.$375,000. Cost 
savings under MJDS are then between U.S.$50,000 (U.S.$150,000-U.S.$100,000) to U.S. 
$125,000 (U.S.$375,000–U.S.$250,000). Using similar methodology, we obtain a cost 
savings of between U.S.$200,000 (U.S.$300,000–U.S.$100,000) to U.S$500,000 
(U.S.$750,000-U.S.$250,000) for a type (b) issuer assuming a three times cost 
difference.11 Consequently, cost savings for type (b) issuers under MJDS range from 
U.S.$50,000 to U.S.$500,000, assuming that legal fees under a non-MJDS scenario are 
between one and a half to three times higher. 
 
The next step is to calculate these costs and cost savings on an aggregate basis, which 
requires taking into account the total number of Canadian MJDS Issuers. Canadian MJDS 
Issuers used Form F-9 for public offerings in the U.S. 12 times on an average annual 
basis in each of 1999, 2001 and 2002.  Similarly, during the same time period, Canadian 
MJDS Issuers used Form F-10 on average for 20 issuances per year. 
 
                                                 
11 The analysis for type (b) issuers assumes that the SEC will engage in a full review of an issuer’s offering 
documents if it makes a public offering as a foreign private issuer or as a U.S. domestic issuer. However, 
the SEC does not review all offering documents. It is possible that, in the absence of MJDS, the SEC may 
decide that certain seasoned issuers warrant “no review” or “limited review” in which case the cost savings 
of MJDS would be less than noted above.  A more complex model would factor in the probability of SEC 
review. 
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Assuming that all these issuers were type (a), then savings benefits from MJDS to 
Canadian MJDS Issuers on an annual basis are between U.S.$3,200,000 ((20 + 12) x 
U.S.$100,000) to U.S.$22,400,000 ((20 + 12) x U.S.$700,000). However, if we assume 
that all of these issuers were type (b), then savings from MJDS to Canadian MJDS 
Issuers annually are between U.S.$1,600,000 ((20 + 12) x U.S.$50,000) and 
U.S.$16,000,000 ((20 + 12) x U.S.$500,000). 
 
Hence, in aggregate, MJDS has resulted in cost savings of between U.S.$1,600,000 to 
U.S.$22,400,000 to Canadian MJDS Issuers on an annual basis for public offerings on 
Forms F-9 and F-10.  
  
Cost Savings in U.S. Counsel Legal Fees associated with MJDS Form 40-F 
 
With respect to continuous disclosure savings for MJDS Form 40-F, our research 
indicates, as noted above, that for both issuer types (a) and (b), U.S. legal counsel fees 
under MJDS can run between U.S.$1,000 to U.S.$10,000, while in a non-MJDS scenario, 
corresponding costs are between U.S.$7,500 to U.S.$12,000. Therefore, cost differences 
are between U.S.$2,000 (U.S.$12,000 – U.S.$10,000) to U.S.$6,500 (U.S.$7,500-
U.S.$1,000). 
 
With respect to continuous disclosure, available data reveals that on average, 87 
Canadian MJDS Issuers used MJDS Form 40-F in 2002 to satisfy their U.S. annual 
disclosure obligations. Therefore, costs savings for annual disclosure filings for Canadian 
MJDS Issuers are between U.S.$174,000 (87 x U.S.$2,000) to U.S.$565,500 (87 x 
U.S.$6,500) on an annual basis.   
 
Cost Savings in respect of Windows of Opportunity 
 
As discussed above, Canadian regulatory review ranges on average from three days to 
two weeks while a corresponding SEC process can take, on average, between six to 
twelve weeks. Hence, on average, Canadian MJDS Issuers can shorten the regulatory 
review process significantly (five and a half to ten weeks), and thus minimize possible 
losses from missed windows of opportunity for favourable financing.   
 
One method to quantify MJDS cost savings from a shorter regulatory review process is 
by assuming that the longer the review process takes, the greater the issuer’s opportunity 
cost as represented by a proportionate decline in share prices. 
 
Hence, we examined monthly trends in the TSE/S&P index for 2001 and 2002. Available 
data suggests that the index declined by an average of 1.7% per month during this time 
period. If MJDS saves Canadian issuers between five and a half to ten weeks then it also 
prevents, on average, between a 2.3375% (1.375 months x 1.7%) to a 4.25% (2.5 months 
x 1.7%) decline in average share prices. 
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Available data indicates that Canadian MJDS Issuers made 16 equity public offerings in 
the U.S., on average, in each of 2001 and 2002, for an average value of approximately 
U.S.$569 million.   
 
Assuming a constant number of shares, a Canadian MJDS Issuer that employed MJDS to 
make an equity public offering in the U.S. in 2001 and 2002 managed to avoid between a 
U.S.$13,300,375 (2.3375/100 x U.S.$569 million) and U.S.$24,182,500 (4.25/100 x 
U.S.$569 million) loss in share value due to potentially longer review by the SEC.12   
 
On average, since there were 16 Canadian issuers that used MJDS to issue equity in each 
of 2001 and 2002, aggregate MJDS savings for these Canadian issuers was 
U.S.$212,806,000 (US $ 13,300,375 x 16) to U.S.$386,920,000 (US $24,182,500 x 16), 
on an annual basis.  
 
It should be noted that this analysis focuses on lost windows of opportunity during 
market declines and does not assess the impact to issuers of market upswings while 
waiting for regulatory approval. This is important as the above benefits may then be 
netted out.  
 
In Parts 4 and 5 of this report, we consider the impact of SOX and the OSC’s Initiatives 
on the MJDS cost savings we have arrived at in this part of the report.  
 
 
 
                                                 
12 As noted in other parts of this report, if the SEC chose to conduct “No Review” of a certain issuer’s 
offering documents, there would be no cost savings.  
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4.The Impact of SOX on Canadian MJDS Issuers 
 
The enactment of SOX in 2002 brought sweeping changes to U.S. securities laws.  This 
part first discusses SOX requirements as they apply to Canadian MJDS Issuers.  We then 
analyze the practical implications of these new requirements for Canadian MJDS Issuers, 
and assess the implications of SOX on the cost benefit analysis of MJDS conducted in 
Part 3 of this study. We conclude by analyzing the policy implications of SOX for the 
continued existence of MJDS.  
 
(a) SOX requirements as applied to Canadian MJDS Issuers 
 
Notwithstanding the general principle that MJDS documents are governed by Canadian 
laws and regulations and are reviewed by Canadian securities regulators, SOX contains 
mandatory features that changes how Canadian MJDS Issuers prepare their disclosure 
documents and potentially subjects Canadian MJDS Issuers to review by the SEC.   
 
The effect of SOX requirements on Canadian MJDS Issuers will depend on how the 
mandatory rules in SOX are interpreted and the substance of the rules that the SEC is 
required to create with respect to SOX.  
 
It is significant to note that SOX does not contain any general exemption for Canadian 
MJDS Issuers or other foreign private issuers. As a general matter, the SEC has the 
authority to create exemptions for Canadian MJDS Issuers and foreign private issuers.  
 
It is uncertain whether the SEC will create exemptions for foreign private issuers 
including Canadian MJDS Issuers from SOX requirements.  However, the SEC’s Final 
Rule on Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet 
Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations released on January 27, 2003, 
clearly states that it applies to foreign private issuers and Canadian MJDS Issuers:13 
 
Application to Foreign Private Issuers 
The amendments apply to foreign private issuers that file 
annual reports on Form 20-F or on Form 40-F. Because Section 
401(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not distinguish between 
foreign private issuers and U.S. companies, we interpret 
Congress' directive to the Commission to adopt rules requiring 
expanded disclosure about off-balance sheet transactions in 
annual reports filed with the Commission to apply equally to 
Form 20-F or 40-F annual reports filed by foreign private 
issuers and to Form 10-K or 10-KSB annual reports filed by 
domestic issuers. … We do not believe that it is appropriate to 
exempt foreign private issuers or MJDS filers because, as 
discussed below, the disclosure requirements do not represent 
                                                 
13Release No. 33-8182 (Jan. 28, 2003) [68 FR 5982] (Effective: April 7, 2003) 
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a fundamental change in our approach with respect to the 
financial disclosure provided by foreign private issuers and 
MJDS filers. 
 
There are two additional reasons for applying the amendments 
to foreign private issuers' annual reports filed with the 
Commission. First, investors and others would enjoy the same 
benefits from expanded off-balance sheet disclosure in foreign 
private issuers' annual reports as they would from this 
disclosure in domestic issuers' annual reports. Second, for 
Form 20-F annual reports, the existing MD&A-equivalent 
requirements for foreign private issuers currently mirror the 
substantive MD&A requirements for U.S. companies. We 
believe this desirable policy should continue. 
 
The disclosure provided by Canadian issuers that file Form 40-
F is generally that required under Canadian law. We have, 
however, supplemented these disclosure requirements with 
specific required items of information. We have adopted 
additional disclosure requirements under Form 40-F as a result 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Although an issuer prepares its 
MD&A discussion contained in a Form 40-F registration 
statement or annual report in accordance with Canadian 
disclosure standards, we believe that requiring disclosure of 
off-balance sheet arrangements and a table of contractual 
obligations in accordance with SEC rules is not inconsistent 
with the principles of the MJDS, is consistent with the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and, most importantly, will provide 
investors with useful information that is comparable to that 
provided by U.S. and other foreign companies that file reports 
under the Exchange Act. (Emphasis added.) 
 
Nonetheless, it is possible that the SEC may grant exemptions for Canadian MJDS 
Issuers and other foreign private issuers in respect of other provisions of SOX.  We have 
identified several provisions of SOX that are particularly relevant to Canadian MJDS 
Issuers: 
 
i. A mandate for the SEC to review filings every three years; 
ii. Addition of substantive disclosure requirements to MJDS 
continuous disclosure forms; and 
iii. Corporate governance measures including CEO/CFO certifications 
and institution of disclosure controls and procedures and other 
changes in internal business practices. 
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The cost implications of these provisions on Canadian MJDS Issuers are discussed in the 
following section.    
 
(b) Impact of SOX on MJDS Cost Savings  
 
SOX requirements are focused on continuous disclosure and they increase the cost of 
compliance with continuous disclosure requirements.  Generally speaking, to the extent 
that Canadian MJDS Issuers, foreign private issuers and U.S. domestic issuers are all 
required to comply with SOX, the cost benefit analysis in Part 3 does not change since 
the overall cost of continuous disclosure compliance has increased for all of them.  This 
conclusion is elaborated on below.  
 
(i) Public Offerings 
 
Generally speaking, SOX does not have a large impact on the cost of public offering 
transactions in the U.S., be it for a Canadian MJDS Eligible Issuer, foreign private issuer, 
or a U.S. domestic issuer.14 The absence of SEC review of listing and offering documents 
under MJDS remains post-SOX and so this savings remains intact for Canadian MJDS 
Issuers post-SOX. 
 
(ii) SEC’s Review of Filings  
 
Section 408 of SOX requires the SEC to review filings of issuers at least once every three 
years.  The benefits associated with the absence of SEC review of MJDS continuous 
disclosure reports would change if the SEC decides to apply section 408 to Canadian 
MJDS Issuers. If the SEC does not apply this provision to Canadian MJDS Issuers, the 
savings associated with the absence of SEC review to such issuers could potentially 
increase because the SEC is putting additional resources into continuous disclosure 
review of other issuers.  
 
To date, the SEC has not provided specific guidance on how it plans to interpret section 
408 and whether it will review MJDS continuous disclosure forms filed by Canadian 
MJDS Issuers.  
 
In a letter to the SEC dated February 19, 2003, the CSA suggested that the SEC and 
Canadian regulators explore the possibility of mutual reliance of reviews by regulators in 
the other jurisdiction or joint reviews. The letter reads:  
 
Continuous Disclosure Review 
 
The CSA has established and continues to develop an increasingly 
robust process for continuous disclosure review. For example, 
some jurisdictions have a goal that issuers based in their 
jurisdiction are subject to a continuous disclosure review once 
                                                 
14One source of additional expense for public offerings by Canadian MJDS Issuers, foreign private issuers 
and U.S. domestic issuers is with respect to disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions.  
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every four years on average. To date, this goal has been met or 
exceeded. Issuers that meet certain risk-based selection criteria are 
reviewed much more often than once every four years; indeed, 
some issuers are currently subject to “real time reviews”, under 
which those issuers’ disclosures are monitored at the time they are 
filed. Other jurisdictions do not have a fixed cycle of reviews but 
do all reviews using a risk-based methodology. We believe that the 
CSA’s continuous disclosure initiatives compare favourably to the 
requirement contained in SOX that U.S. issuers be reviewed no 
less frequently than once every three years.  
 
Canadian Issuers that are U.S. registrants are subject to continuous 
disclosure review by both Canadian and U.S. regulators. These 
reviews can entail considerable duplication of effort. This 
duplication will increase substantially as the review programs in 
both our jurisdictions become more robust and comprehensive.  
 
We would like to explore with the SEC the possibility of a protocol 
that would enable Canadian securities regulators and the SEC to 
rely on reviews conducted by the other, subject to appropriate 
systems of oversight. Alternatively, we could explore the possibility 
of a joint continuous disclosure review process of those issuers 
that are inter-listed. The Ontario Securities Commission and the 
SEC have, in the past, carried out joint reviews of Canadian 
issuers that are U.S. registrants. The CSA would be happy to 
discuss procedures for information sharing, joint reviewing, 
consulting, and any other matters relevant to this objective. 
(Emphasis added.)  
 
We understand that, to date, the SEC has not clarified its position in this regard. 
 
(iii) Corporate Governance Measures  
 
With respect to corporate governance, SOX also imposes new business imperatives such 
as CEO/CFO certification and disclosure controls and procedures and other changes in 
internal business practices.  However, these provisions are applicable equally to Canadian 
MJDS Issuers, foreign private issuers, and U.S. domestic issuers.15  Because these costs 
are imposed on all three classes of issuers, the cost savings associated with MJDS 
analyzed in Part 3 are not affected.   
 
(c) Costs of Compliance with SOX  
 
SOX increases the costs of compliance for Canadian MJDS Issuers as well as Canadian 
issuers that report as foreign private issuers and U.S. domestic issuers. The incremental 
costs of compliance relate primarily to increases in: (a) external audit fees; (b) U.S. legal 
                                                 
15 However, note that CEO/CFO certification is not required for financial statements on MJDS Form 6-K. 
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counsel fees; (c) directors’ and officers’ insurance premiums; and (d) increases in time 
spent by directors, officers and staff in complying with SOX.   
 
A survey conducted by U.S. law firm Foley & Lardner found that SOX has doubled the 
cost of being a public company in the U.S. from U.S.$1.3 million to almost U.S.$2.5 
million.16  Compliance with SOX is estimated at approximately U.S.$1.2 million, on 
average, for a mid-sized public company. Their study was based on responses from 32 
mostly mid-sized companies and a review of 328 proxy statements, as well as interviews 
with accountants, insurers and public relations companies.  
 
The study found that as a result of SOX, directors’ and officers’ insurance increased 94.2 
percent from U.S.$329,000 to U.S.$639,000; accounting fees increased by 105 percent 
from U.S.$243,000 to U.S.$499,000; legal fees increased by 90.6 percent from 
U.S.$210,000 to U.S.$404,000; directors’ expected annual number of hours devoted to 
board work almost doubled from an average of 125 to more than 200; and compliance 
personnel costs increased by 268 percent.  
 
We contacted several Canadian MJDS Issuers in order to estimate their costs of 
compliance associated with SOX. However, very few issuers responded, and of those that 
did, few were able to provide us with precise figures.     
 
Our interviews with three Canadian MJDS Issuers suggest that they were of the view that 
the internal costs of compliance with SOX are significant but that it is too early to 
precisely indicate what those costs are.  For example, many seasoned Canadian MJDS 
Issuers have regulatory compliance departments that are responsible for matters such as 
SOX. To the extent that employees in such departments have shifted their focus to 
address SOX compliance or have added to their workload, many issuers found it difficult 
to precisely measure the incremental costs associated with SOX compliance. 
One issuer, a financial institution interlisted on the TSX and the NYSE, indicated that it 
had incurred very little in the way of incremental costs. This issuer emphasized that much 
of the compliance with SOX was accomplished through existing salaried personnel, 
including Canadian and U.S. lawyers and accounting staff, and it was unable to provide 
us with an estimate of hours spent by internal personnel.  It indicated that they did not 
incur significant increases in external U.S. legal counsel fees to date because they had a 
U.S. lawyer on staff.   
Another issuer, a large mining and metal company, interlisted on the TSX and the NYSE 
also advised us that its costs of compliance with SOX has not been overwhelmingly 
large. This issuer’s chief legal counsel indicated that it had incurred US$50,000 to 
US$100,000 to date, comprised of increases in external auditor and U.S. legal counsel 
fees and also to set up a whistleblower mechanism handled by an independent third party 
provider. 
                                                 
16 Presentation by Lance Jon Kimmel & Steven Vanquez of Foley Lardner entitled  “The Increased 
Financial and Non-Financial Cost of Staying Public” at the National Directors Institute  (Chicago: April, 
2003) 
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However, another issuer, a large financial institution, interlisted on the TSX and the 
NYSE, with an international presence and U.S. subsidiaries, suggested that it was 
incurring significant costs in complying with SOX.  This issuer’s chief accountant 
estimated its sunk or one-time costs to be over CDN$5 million.  It was estimated that the 
external auditor would spend 1,000 additional hours at a value of CDN$1 million, and 
that internal accounting staff would spend 2,000 hours at a value of CDN$2 million.  It 
was estimated that compliance measures for each of the issuer’s divisions would total 
over CDN$2 million. Annual increases in the external auditor’s fees were estimated at 
CDN$500,000.  
Given the rather wide range of values we obtained from our interview process, we 
extrapolated average values of compliance with SOX from the Foley Lardner study. As 
the study indicates, a mid-sized U.S. issuer experienced an increase of U.S.$256,000 in 
accounting fees (from U.S.$243,000 to U.S.$499,000) and an increase of U.S.$194,000 in 
legal fees (from U.S.$210,000 to U.S.$404,000), resulting in a total cost increase in 
external professional fees in the amount of U.S.$450,000. We assume that these figures 
also apply to Canadian issuers listed in the U.S.17 For the purpose of our analysis, we 
focus on external accounting and legal fees, as these were the costs that were consistently 
referred to by issuers we interviewed.  As indicated earlier, Table 2 reveals that there are 
a total of 202 Canadian issuers listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ and the American Stock 
Exchange. Based on these assumptions, compliance with SOX has increased the fees paid 
to external legal and accounting professionals by an aggregate of U.S.$90,900,000 (202 x 
U.S.$450,000) for these Canadian issuers.  
 
Would these Canadian issuers experience significant costs savings if the SEC exempted 
them from compliance with requirements under SOX and allowed them to comply with 
comparable Canadian requirements that conform to SOX?  
 
One Canadian issuer indicated that its costs of compliance would have been fifty percent 
less if it instead could have complied with Canadian rules that conform to SOX. If 
Canadian MJDS Issuers (and other Canadian issuers currently required to comply with 
SOX) were exempted by the SEC from SOX compliance and could instead comply with 
Canadian regulatory standards that conform to SOX, it is possible that such issuers would 
experience some level of cost savings.  This would result from Canadian issuers being 
able to hire external Canadian professional advisors as opposed to external U.S. 
professional advisors whose billings would be approximately one-third less when the 
exchange rate is taken into account. To the extent that comparable Canadian advisors 
charge marginally less than their U.S. counterparts, there very well could be other savings 
in addition to the thirty-three percent savings resulting from the exchange rate. While we 
cannot with confidence conclude that there would be an overall fifty percent savings, 
there is certainly a possibility that Canadian issuers’ costs of compliance would be 
reduced significantly. 
 
                                                 
17 80% of the Foley Lardner’s survey responses were from companies with revenues under U.S.$1 billion 
and 20% were from companies with revenues over U.S.$1 billion.  The survey notes that “the costs for 
larger mid-cap and S&P 500 companies will be proportionately more (3-5x ) higher in dollar terms”. 
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This reasoning suggests that the figure of U.S.$90 million that we have indicated is the 
aggregate cost of external professional fees paid by Canadian issuers currently required to 
comply with SOX requirements could drop by at least thirty-three percent and likely to 
more than forty percent if such issuers were instead able to comply with comparable 
Canadian requirements that conform to SOX requirements. Using forty percent as the 
estimated cost savings, we conclude that if Canadian issuers listed in the U.S. could 
comply with Canadian requirements that conform to SOX requirements instead of 
compliance with SOX requirements, their compliance costs would drop to 
U.S.$54,540,000. 
 
There is a risk at the margin that given the new SOX requirements, some Canadian 
issuers, MJDS eligible or otherwise, may exit (or not access) U.S. public capital markets, 
because in absolute terms, it has become too expensive.  However, this is unlikely for 
seasoned Canadian MJDS Issuers.  Many of the increased cost of compliance with SOX 
are one-time implementation costs and their significance should be considered on an on-
going basis.  Internal compliance costs, external auditing fees and external U.S. counsel 
legal fees to put internal business practices in place and get up the learning curve on new 
corporate governance methods could be substantial up front, but when amortized over the 
long run, they are not significant, especially for seasoned Canadian MJDS Issuers.    
 
The next part of this report addresses the OSC’s Initiatives and the implications for 
MJDS.   
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5. The OSC’s Initiatives 
 
Following the SEC’s lead with SOX, a number of significant amendments were made to 
the Securities Act (Ontario).18 These amendments were proclaimed into force effective 
April 7, 2003.  The OSC now has the authority to require reporting issuers to appoint 
audit committees and prescribe requirements on the functioning and responsibilities of 
audit committees. The amended Securities Act (Ontario) also authorizes the OSC to 
create rules with respect to CEO and CFO certification similar to those currently in effect 
in the U.S. pursuant to SOX including certification of systems of internal control and 
disclosure controls. The OSC has also been granted rule-making authority to prescribe 
financial accounting, and reporting and auditing requirements. The OSC is in the process 
of preparing draft rules to be released for comment with respect to this rule-making 
authority. 
 
This part of the report analyses the OSC’s Initiatives, their relationship to SOX and their 
impact on MJDS. This part of the report also analyses the policy implications and 
practical impact on Canadian MJDS Issuers, if provinces other than Ontario do not also 
conform to SOX.  Finally, this section analyses the implications for the cost benefit 
analysis conducted in Parts 3 and 4 of this study.  
 
(a) Effect of the OSC’s Initiatives on MJDS Savings  
 
The OSC’s Initiatives will not significantly impact the cost of offerings to reporting 
issuers in Ontario (whether Canadian MJDS Issuers or not) because neither SOX 
requirements nor the OSC’s Initiatives focus on the offering stage. The cost savings of 
MJDS associated with the absence of SEC review for offerings remain intact, irrespective 
of whether the OSC’s Initiatives are implemented and whether or not they conform to 
SOX. 
 
The cost savings of MDJS associated with the absence of SEC review of MJDS Form 40-
F (subject to application of section 408 of SOX requiring SEC review at least every three 
years) also remain intact, even if the OSC’s Initiatives are implemented and do not 
conform exactly to SOX. 
 
The OSC’s Initiatives with respect to corporate governance measures will impose 
additional costs on all reporting issuers in Ontario that do not report in the U.S.  
However, the OSC’s Initiatives will not impact reporting issuers in Ontario that are 
Canadian MJDS Issuers, foreign private issuers or U.S domestic issuers, and are therefore 
already subject to SOX so long as the OSC’s Initiatives conform exactly to SOX.  
 
 
 
                                                 
18 See amendments to the Securities Act (Ontario) in S.O. 2002, c.22, Keeping the Promise for a Strong 
Economy Act (Budget Measures), 2002. 
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Canadian MJDS Issuers that were interviewed for this study emphasized that the OSC 
should conform its rules entirely to SOX. They suggested that any slight differences from 
the SOX requirements with which they are required to comply would impose additional 
costs on them. Several of such issuers indicated that if the OSC plans to even slightly 
change its requirements from those in SOX, that reporting issuers in Ontario that are 
eligible to use MJDS (or that must comply with SOX) be exempted from the OSC’s 
Initiatives or, in the alternative, be permitted to file their SOX disclosures with the OSC.  
 
 
(b) Impact on MJDS of Canadian Rules Conforming to SOX 
 
As noted above, the short-term status of MJDS is that all pre-SOX Canadian MJDS 
Issuers are entitled, post-SOX, to use MJDS for offerings and continuous disclosure so 
long as they comply with SOX. This is irrespective of whether the OSC and/or the other 
provincial securities commissions implement rules that conform to SOX. In the long run, 
however, the greater the actual or perceived gap between Canadian and U.S. regulatory 
standards, the greater the risk that MJDS could be eliminated.  To this end, adoption of 
rules nationally that conform to SOX will increase the probability of maintaining MJDS 
and also obtaining a carve-out for Canadian issuers from SOX requirements.   
 
Provinces that do not conform to SOX  may experience capital flight, at the margin.  
Empirical studies indicate that over time high quality issuers migrate to jurisdictions with 
stronger investor protection regimes. These studies reveal that issuers that make credible 
commitments to the market to observe higher standards of disclosure and corporate 
governance experience lower costs of capital,19 greater liquidity,20 higher returns21 and 
enhanced analyst coverage.22 Non-SOX conforming provinces could attempt to avoid net 
                                                 
19 See D.W. Diamond and R.E. Verrechia, “Disclosure, Liquidity and the Cost of Capital”, 46 J. Finance 
(1991) 1325 (Finding a commitment to increased disclosure, which reduces information asymmetries, 
produces lower costs of capital); C.B. Barry and S.J. Brown, “Limited Information as a Source of Risk”, 12  
J. Portfolio Management 66. (Investors usually have less than perfect information on firm profitability, and 
if this risk is non-diversifiable, investors will demand an incremental return for bearing information risk. As 
a result, firms with high levels of disclosure and consequently low information risk are likely to have a 
lower cost of capital than firms with low disclosure levels and high information risk.)  
   
20 O. Kim, & R. Verrechia, “Market Liquidity and Volume Around Earnings Announcements”, 17 Journal 
of Accounting and Economics (1994) 41 (Finding that increased disclosure enhances stock liquidity); See 
also S. Huddart, John Hughes and Markus Brunnermeier, “Disclosure Requirements and Stock Exchange 
Listing Choice in an International Context”, (Working Paper, 1998)(Finding that exchanges competing for 
trading volume engage in a “race for the top” under which disclosure requirements increase and trading 
costs fall.)       
 
21 See P. Healy, H. Hutton, K. Palepu, “Stock Performance and Intermediation Changes Surrounding 
Sustained Increases in Disclosure”, 16 Contemporary Accounting Research (1999) 485 (Finding that 
issuers that produce greater disclosure experience significant contemporaneous increases in stock prices 
that are unrelated to current earnings performance); See Stephen Foerster and G. Andrew Karolyi, “The 
Effects of Market Segmentation and Investor Recognition on Asset Prices: Evidence from Foreign Stocks 
Listing in the United States”, 54 J. Fin. 981 (Finding that firms cross-listing in the U.S. earn cumulative 
abnormal returns of 19% in the year before listing).  
22 C.A. Botosan, “Disclosure Level and The Cost of Equity Capital”, 72(3) Accounting Review (1997) 323 
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capital flight (and possibly attract more capital) in the post SOX environment by 
positioning themselves as niche players providing a more flexible, lenient market for 
smaller, younger firms that are not ready to access the more mature Canadian and U.S. 
markets. However, the benefits of a flexible and more lenient regulatory environment 
could be offset by an increase in issuers’ cost of capital and reduced liquidity because of 
the actual or perceived risks associated with such a marketplace.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 (Finding that firms with low analyst coverage have a negative relation between the cost of equity capital 
and the extent of their voluntary disclosures). C.A. Botosan and M.A. Plumlee, “A Re-Examination of 
Disclosure Level and Expected Cost of Capital” (Working Paper, 2000) (Finding a negative cross-sectional 
relation between cost of capital and analyst rankings of annual report disclosures).   
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6. Summary of Cost Benefit Analysis 
 
The tables below summarize our results and also provide corresponding Net Present 
Values assuming 4%, 7%, and 10% discount rates over a 10-year period, which is typical 
for a cost benefit analysis. 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Cost Savings From MJDS  
(US $)(Over a Ten-Year Period) 
 
 Annual Figures 4% Discount Rate 7% Discount Rate 10% Discount Rate 
 Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
(A) Aggregate 
Cost Savings to 
Canadian 
MJDS Issuers 
from using 
Forms F-9 and 
F-10 for U.S. 
public offerings  
1,600,000 22,400,000 13,496,531 188,951,428 12,024,372 168,341,202 10,814,438 151,402,133.5 
         
(B) Aggregate 
Cost Savings to 
Canadian 
MJDS Issuers 
from using 
MJDS annual 
disclosure 
forms 
174,000 565,000 1,467,748 
 
4,770,180 
 
 
1,307,650,411 4,249,864 1,176,070 3,822,228 
         
(C) Aggregate 
Cost Savings to 
Canadian 
MJDS Issuers 
from 
minimization of 
lost windows of 
opportunity 
212,860,000 386,920,000 1,795,544,687 
 
3,263,798,507 
 
1,599,692,336 2,907,793,662 1,438,725,810 
 
2,615,201,495 
 
    
 
     
TOTAL 214,634,000 409,885,500 1,810,508,965 3,457,520,115 1,613,024,358 3,080,384,728 1,450,716,318 
 
2,770,425,856 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4 
Expected Costs of External Professional Fees for Compliance with SOX 
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and Canadian Rules that Conform to SOX 
(US $) (Over a Ten-Year Period) 
 
 
 Annual Figures 4% Discount 
Rate 
7% Discount 
Rate 
10% Discount 
Rate 
(A) Aggregate 
Costs of 
External 
Professional 
Fees paid by 
Canadian 
Issuers listed in 
the U.S. to 
comply with 
SOX 
90,900,000 766,771,643 683,134,611 614,395,265 
 
 
     
(B) Aggregate 
Costs of 
External 
Professional 
Fees that would 
be paid by 
Canadian 
Issuers listed in 
the U.S. 
assuming the 
existence of 
Canadian rules 
that conform to 
SOX and an 
exemption from 
the SEC from 
compliance 
with SOX  
54,540,000 460,062,986 409,880,767 368,637,159 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This report has found that MJDS offers significant savings to Canadian MJDS Issuers. 
Our cost benefit results are sensitive to discount and upper and lower bound assumptions. 
Our calculations reveal that the Net Present Value of aggregate cost savings to Canadian 
MJDS Issuers for (a) using Forms F-9 and F-10 for U.S. public offerings; (b) using 
MJDS forms for meeting U.S. annual disclosure obligations; and (c) from minimizing 
lost “windows of opportunities”, ranges from US$1.6 billion to US$3 billion over a ten 
year period, assuming a discount rate of 7%. 
 
We find that the main savings of MJDS remain intact despite Canadian MJDS Issuers 
being required to comply with SOX.  
 
Our analysis reveals that the OSC’s Initiatives will impose additional costs on all 
reporting issuers in Ontario that are not Canadian MJDS Issuers. However, the OSC’s 
Initiatives will not impose additional costs on reporting issuers in Ontario that are 
Canadian MJDS Issuers to the extent that the OSC’s Initiatives conform with SOX.  
 
The Net Present Value of the external professional fees paid by Canadian issuers listed in 
the U.S. to comply with SOX is estimated at U.S.$683 million over a ten-year period, 
using a discount rate of seven percent. If Canadian Issuers listed in the U.S. were 
exempted from compliance with SOX by the SEC and could instead comply with 
Canadian rules that conform to SOX, this amount would drop to approximately U.S.$410 
million, resulting in a cost savings of approximately U.S.$273 million. 
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